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The Equal Rights Amendment as an
Instrument for Social Change
Lynn Andretta Fishel and Clarine Nardi Riddle
"The Equal Rights Amendment: Will it do so little, we don't need it
-or so much, we shouldn't have it?"
The paradox stems from the arguments of the groups who oppose the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). 1 On one hand, they claim that the
14th Amendment and Title V1II provide all the tools women need, so the
ERA won't be able to accomplish anything uniquely significant. On the
other hand they contend, with even greater fervor, that the ERA will be so
powerful it will destroy the fabric of society. The paradox is not al-
together ludicrous, however, when it is recognized that it has been almost
equally difficult for the proponents of the amendment to articulate its
benefits and/or drawbacks. This article attempts to estimate the probable
impact of the Equal Rights Amendment as an instrument for social change,
assuming ratification. 2
INTRODUCTION
The Equal Rights Amendment will be more than a symbolic addition to
our Constitution. Its immediate impact could include such changes as the
acceptance of sex as a suspect classification in interpreting constitutional
law, and the complete elimination of the bona fide occupational qualifi-
M1s. Fishel, a second xear Indiana University law student, received her B.A. in History from the
Univ ersity of Maryland. This summer she will be an aide to Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) for the
Constitutional Amendment Subcommittee hearings on the abortion issue and as organizer for
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.
11s. Riddle, a third xear Indiana University law student, received her A.B. in Mathematics from
Indiana University. She is co-author of a paper, entitled "The Probable Effects of the Equal Rights
Amendment in Indiana," and is the 1973-74 Coordinator of the Law School WAomen's Caucus.
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cation exception from Title VII implementation, both discussed below.
But will it automatically bring about such change as to fundamentally and
immediately alter traditional ways of doing things? We think not. The goals
and powers of the Equal Rights Amendment are noncoercive as applied to
individual life-style. The focus is on equal rights under the law and the en-
forcement powers are directed against only governmental entities and offi-
cials, not private individuals, for possible abridgement of these legal rights.
The ideal is to allow each person, regardless of sex, freedom of choice and an
equal opportunity for realizing personal objectives and expectations. Count-
less women, and men, are waiting to utilize its mandate to remove existing
obstacles to full achievement, but expansion of the ERA's effect beyond this
group-that is, expansion to the society as a whole-will come only so quick-
ly as our culture is ready and willing to change.
IMMEDIATE FORESEEABLE IMPACT
Sex as a Suspect Classification
The 14th Amendment was enacted to deal with problems of race. Though
there are many parallels between the problems of the black race and the
second sex, there are many dissimilarities as well. Currently notable is the
lack of a sense of outrage concerning the treatment of women. Sexism,
founded on a pervasive negative socialization, is extremely destructive of
women's sense of identity and self-confidence. It places an almost iron
grip on the range of the typical woman's aspirations. Sex should be a
suspect classification, as is race. This would result in strict court scrutiny
of any purpose cited by a state to justify treating all members of a class
the same. Rather than permitting statutes which so broadly classify, this
strict scrutiny generally would result in a requirement that the statute fall
or be rewritten in neutral language. But the Supreme Court has been un-
willing to stretch the 14th Amendment so far for the purpose of safe-
guarding the legal rights of women.3
This means that the Constitution, which is supposed to provide the
principled underpinnings for our law, is male-oriented-with the exception
of the amendment extending suffrage to women. Since that exception
could only exist in the context of a contrary "rule," women are presently
in a poor position to have the full sweep of constitutional rights and duties
applied to them.
A blatant example is the Hoy t4 decision concerning jury service by women.
The holding, in effect, says women may not be totally excluded from
service, but that, if they wish to be selected for jury duty, they must take
the initiative in communicating this desire to the local courts. This puts
the onus on the woman and immediately casts the performance of civic
duties by her in the realm of the exceptional. The deterrent effect of such
a system if applied on the basis of race would be immediately recognized
and stricken as impermissible discrimination.
Administrative efficiency, a justification for the procedure sustained in
Hoy t, could be argued to have been eliminated as a legitimate state purpose
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for a classification based on sex, bv the more recent Reed 5 and Frontiero6
decisions. But these decisions, by failing to adopt the stricter scrutiny
test, leave the burden of proof on the woman assailing the system. In each
case, the equivocating about which female stereotype is too dear to strike
down "precipitately" will continue. The suspect classification criterion
applied to race reverses this burden and places it on the state to show a
compelling interest which is to be served. So far, no state interest has been
found sufficiently "compelling" to sustain a racially discriminatory classi-
fication. This is a more than symbolic distinction and it is probable that
passage of the ERA will rectify the discrepancy.
Title VII and the BFOQ
In the area of employment, where the greatest progress has been made
toward the goal of equality, the legislation which has so far proved the
most important tool for women is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 7
However, there are drawbacks here as well. The law is encumbered by a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception 8 and an equivocal
legislative history.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines concerning
the BFOQ would limit it to physical attributes crucial to job performance
and sexual attributes necessary for authenticity (actors, actresses and
models, for example). While this interpretation would permit very few
legitimate BFOQ exceptions to prevent women or men from taking parti-
cular jobs, and while the courts have given great lip service to these guide-
lines, an examination of the cases shows something of the same problem
discussed above-an oppressive burden of persuasion on the individual
litigant-not to mention the burden of litigation itself.
In Phillips,9 the Martin-Marietta company had refused the plaintiff so
much as a job interview, based on the fact that she had pre-school age
children: a sex-plus basis for discrimination. This is inconsistent with the
thrust of the act which is to judge individuals on the basis of their own
talents and abilities, and was little comfort to the seven children Ms.
Phillips had to support. It would be legitimate for any corporation to set
minimum standards to which all employees would be expected to conform
with regard to tardiness, absenteeism, etc. Any man or woman, with or
without pre-school age children, who failed to meet these criteria, could
be fired on that basis. But here the whole sub-class was excluded from even
the possibility of a job interview on the basis of an unproved belief that
such problems would arise.
As with Reed, the Court's opinion in Phillips was hardly a ringing af-
firmation of women's rights. While "rejecting" the sex-plus basis for
discrimination, it indicated that proof of a sex-based BFOQ regarding dif-
ferential family obligations might be acceptable.
The Diaz 10 case, a lower court decision, rejected this "demonstrably
more relevant for women" standard of Phillips, and ordered the airline
involved to redefine "cabin attendant" so as not to exclude all men as a
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class. This decision carries the best language so far for undercutting the
BFOQ in that, even if the airline continued to believe women were better
suited to the job, it was placed under an obligation to interview and hire
men, treating each job applicant as an individual-in effect, footing the
bill not only for overcoming its own past discrimination, but under-
cutting societal stereotypes and differential in past training as well.
However, the Supreme Court has yet to go so far. Therefore, the con-
tinued existence of the BFOQ in this legislation is a threat to the achieve-
ment of complete equality. There is no parallel with regard to race, no
permissible reason for excluding an entire race as a class. Yet with the
BFOQ women and men who do not fit the current cultural stereotypes
must bear the burden of proving this to an employer-must frequently
resort to the expensive and time-consuming process of litigation-to prove
their ability to handle a particular job.
And what is perhaps even worse, the sex-plus classification method of
discriminating against a whole sub-class of women may not be completely
dead. In Cohen, 1 a lower Federal court decided a rule forcing pregnant
women to leave their jobs before they would have had to do so on the
advice of their physicians was not discrimination because of sex. This is
a very dangerous ruling and seems to us nothing other than sex-plus thinly
disguised. Nearly half the working force is presently comprised of women, 12
and they are not working for luxuries. 1 3 It is precisely the women with
children, or about to bear children, who most need the shield of the law
to maintain their job competitiveness. The decision when to leave the job-
or which job to apply for (assuming other necessary qualifications)-should
be a matter of individual choice. It should become the company's business
only when the woman is demonstrably unable to perform her duties.
The Cohen case is currently on appeal to the Supreme Court and will be
well worth watching. However, another narrow decision in our "favor"
will leave the latent threat of the BFOQ undisturbed.14 Perhaps only with
the passage of the ERA, which does not include a BFOQ exception, will
this threat truly be eliminated.
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
The process of interpreting the Equal Rights Amendment will probably
be similar to the history of the 14th Amendment, though hopefully minus
the 100 years of inactivity experienced by blacks. We expect the initial
construction to be fairly narrow, with the exceptions already noted con-
cerning sex as a suspect classification and the elimination of the BFOQ
exception. Thereafter, the applications will probably broaden, extending
in the direction taken by the 14th Amendment as to state action and af-
firmative action. We believe this process will be slow, but with the ERA
playing a meaningful role in reducing the number of stereotypes legally
applicable to women and expanding the occupational and other roles
women will more and more commonly fill.
The anti-ERA forces seem to believe that fundamental change will
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somehow be wrought overnight. It is true that both public institutions
and private industries and unions will be more likely to examine their
laws, regulations, and procedures concerning women after ratification of
the ERA than are currently worrying over the applicability of the Reed
decision to their operations. But fundamental change is not brought about
so rapidly, independent of how one might feel about its desirabilit\.
The fears of the opponents are compounded of a lack of perception
regarding the present realities of our culture, together with a fear of
change per se. We will attempt to deal with three areas of these fears
which seem more legitimate to us in that they are areas where, if the
ERA is misinterpreted, an element of coercion might be introduced:
family law, protective legislation and the draft.
Family Law
In the area of family law after the ERA, xxe believe the support obli-
gation will be defined in more functional terms based, for example, on
each spouse's actual earning power, current resources, and nonmonetary
contributions to the family welfare. Many opponents believe that the
ERA will indirectly weaken society, the family, and man's desire and
obligation to support the family, by forcing unwilling women out to work.
The central fear is that the man in the marriage relationship will not assume
his responsibilities unless made legally accountable. This is rather ironic
since the foes of the ERA are the same ones who continue to uphold the
virtues of men as pillars of the family, the church, and community. They
see the woman as responsible for supporting the man in whatever role he
takes and in whatever decision he makes, should the couple choose to
follow the currently accepted pattern of family life. They fail to note,
that the current pattern already includes a high proportion of women
who have no choice but to work and/or supplement low incomes. 15
Since the law does not typically interfere with the ongoing marriage
relationship, the fears that women will be forced to work focus mainly
on the divorce proceeding-where the practical effects of current law are
not so favorable to women as is the popular myth. Statistics show alimony
support is very infrequently awarded by courts.1 6 Since public policy and
peer pressure encourage all persons to take active roles in the working
community after divorce, women are discouraged from seeking alimony,
even when they have nearly no working-world skills. In the present child
custody system, the payments are usually so minimal in comparison to
what is needed to raise the children and combat the day care and other
employment obstacles xwomen face, that in actuality xwomen are supply'-
ing more than half of the child support. 17
After passage of the ERA, it may be possible to recognize more directlx
the nonmonetary contributions women make to the family xwelfare be-
fore dixvorce through more realistic alimony and child support provisions.
Since it may be impossible for the man alone to compensate for the lack
of employable skills in his ex xwife, forms of woman-power retraining and
education might become increasingly axailable for those who desire it,
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subsidized by government scholarships and/or loans. This result may in fact
be mandated by a concept of equal treatment of the partners at divorce.
Protective Legislation
Fear of losing protective legislation has been until recently the major line
of opposition to the ERA as recited by unions. 18 This concern is probably
the most legitimate, when considered in relation to lower-income women
who are perennially exploited in the working world. But when extended to
other areas it isn't a valid argument, since it is just such legislation which is
used to keep women in their lower-paying, lower-status places.
It is an even less valid fear when it is realized that differences concerning
weight lifting and other unequal benefits and detriments of employment
were the first to be challenged under Title VII. The Bowel 9 and Weeks 2 0
decisions leave little doubt but that it will be impossible to write future
pieces of protective legislation covering a single sex. Bowe stands for the
proposition that weight limits must first be proved job related, under
Griggs-type criteria, 2 1 and then individuals regardless of sex must be given
the opportunity to qualify. This tendency will not be halted by defeating
the ERA.
The very legitimate fears of lower-income working women, who are at
a definite disadvantage in the work force and who will most probably always
be taken advantage of by their employers no matter what the laws are,
would be better directed toward the unions whose duty it is to provide
fair representation for all employees covered in their contracts. Women in
fields not presently under union contracts would be no harder to organize
than were men in the early days of the union movement if the unions were
willing to demonstrate their relevance to these women by allocating pro-
gram priorities and financial resources to fight for such things as day care
facilities and the continuation of benefits during temporary pregnancy
leaves.
One can only hope the burdens will not increase after passage of the
ERA, but very articulate working women, taking into consideration who
they work for and the current union belief that they represent an economic
threat, see this not-so-nice-or-easy road as quite plausible. This impact could
be avoided by extension of protective legislation to both sexes, or by the
adoption of technological changes which could equalize job burdens which
impact differentially against women. This would also forestall union fears
that seniority and promotion systems will be undermined by "special"
treatment for women. Such solutions, including innovative job classifi-
cations and descriptions incorporating part-time employment possibil-
ities, may actually be facilitated by passage of the ERA.
The Draft
Some of the most emotional arguments in opposition to ERA raise the
specter of women being drafted into the armed services and sent into the
front lines of active combat. Commonly ignored are the facts that: 1)
Congress has always had the power to authorize the drafting of women;
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2) with an all-volunteer army, no one will be in the trenches who has not
volunteered to go there
But to deal with these fears, rather than avoid them, let us suppose that
the volunteer army fails to raise sufficient personnel, the draft is reinstated
in time of war, and women are called. First, there has always been a hard-
ship exemption for men whose families could not survive without their
services. This could be invoked to insure that children were not left parent-
less while both their mother and father donned battle fatigues. Secondly,
the conscientious objector status could be expanded to cover both women
and men philosophically and psychologically against service. It could be
one of the real plusses of passage of the ERA that, with the expansion of
the pool of draft-eligible persons, the heretofore strict standards could be
loosened for everyone's benefit, and greater numbers of prospective draftees
would be channeled away from combat and into alternative service.
But what of the woman who can invoke none of these methods and is
drafted? Once you get beyond the draft, the military establishment can
be viewed as an industry with so many jobs to be performed, each of which
will have job-related standards for qualification. Many women will be able
and willing to serve their country-and equally anxious to qualify for the
skill training and veterans benefits which follow from such service. Sta-
tistically, it is unlikely many women will be in the front lines, for even in
time of war, the proportion of military personnel actually in combat is
miniscule-and the proportion of women, as compared to men, who will
have the physical prowess necessary for actual combat will not be great.
Affirmative Action
The question now centers on a fear plaguing the proponents of the
Equal Rights Amendment. What effect will the ERA have on the already-
initiated affirmative action efforts of Title VII and the continuation of
this type of thrust under new legislation following passage?
As Owen Fiss has articulated 2 2 the purpose of Title VII is in a state of
tension between seeking "treatment" through color-blindness or sex-
blindness; and seeking opportunity for achievement. For the latter goal,
"blindness" is insufficient; it can have the effect of perpetuating the im-
balance created by past discrimination. Therefore, groups discriminated
against must be recognized as such, at least initially, for purposes of ad-
vancing them to a truly competitive position.
The proponents of "blindness," which requires that we cease consider-
ing race or sex, would have us believe that this is more in line with the
Constitution as it presently stands and that passage of the ERA will even
more definitely mandate that everyone be treated the same. Justice Burger
in Griggs, however, furthered the interpretation that the thrust of Title
VII is toward seeking opportunity and achievement when he required
div ersifying the pool of qualified applicants and supported the right of
the individual to be hired on his or her own merits. Title VII has a section
forbidding preferential treatment, which was dismissed as not being an
impediment to this interpretation. The power for Title VII is derived from
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the 14th Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The language of the ERA
is very similar to the 14th Amendment except for the explicit application
against sex-based discrimination. After ratification the power for such an
interpretation will not be impaired: the ERA will be construed as part of
the whole fabric of the Constitution.
Affirmative action can be consistent with remedial action. The continuing
effects of past discrimination can be channeled to identify the victims and
to provide remedies, as noted in Ogilvie,2 3 and Carter. 24 The victim is
thereby enabled to participate from a more equitable level, rather than
from a disadvantaged point.
Can one say that society was wrong relative to past discrimination and
then leave the victim to do all the untangling of the problem? Or must one
make society's basic institutions respond by challenging their discriminatory
assumptions and then integrating the diversity of the races and sexes on
an equivalent footing?
The remedies are very difficult to fashion, but one thing is clear: we will
not make discrimination evaporate by closing our eyes. There will still be
discriminatory attitudes, acts, and institutions with which to contend. An
affirmative duty must be asserted to undo past discrimination and to
minimize it when it arises from activities of other institutions in society.
Clearly the passage of ERA would not stall the already begun affirmative
action efforts under Title VII. It should instead lead to many more such
efforts, tailored to aiding women in areas other than employment to combat
the effects of the past.
CONCLUSION
Currently the Court and the Congress seem predisposed to advance
progress, albeit incrementally. However, legislative enactments can be
defeated and favorable court decisions can be reversed. But an unequivocal
constitutional amendment would ultimately have to be interpreted to bring
true legal equality to both women and men.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The Equal Rights Amendment: Sec. 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article.
Sec. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification. H.R.J.
Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S.J. Res. 8, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
2. As of February 17, 1974, thirty-three states of a necessary thirty-eight had ratified the
Equal Rights Amendment. They are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
3. Justice Douglas remarked in an address at IU that he has always personally felt that the
14th Amendment covered the rights of women, but that this is not a majority opinion on
the Court. Herald- Telephone, April 27, 1973. Dramatic confirmation of this fact came with
the decision of Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) where Brennan, Douglas,
White and Marshall explicitly stated their willingness to declare sex-based distinctions in-
herently suspect. Concurring in the invalidation of the discriminatory regulations at issue in
the case, but not in the more general statements concerning sex discrimination, were Black-
mun, Burger, Powell and Stewart. Rehnquist dissented.
4. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 58 (1961).
5. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
6. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See Footnote 3 above.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 52000 et seq.
8. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees. .. on the basis
of... .sex. . .in those certain instances where. .. sex. . .is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operations of that particular business or enter-
prise. . ." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (3).
9. Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
10. Diaz v. Pan American Airlines, 442 Fed. 2d 385 (5th Cir., 1971).
11. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 474 FEd. 2d 395 (4th Cir., 1971).
12. According to U.S. Department of Labor statistics, in 1971 women comprised 41% of the
working force and 42.7% of all women over 16 were employed. This is almost double the
number of women in the work force twenty years ago.
13. A 1970, U.S. Department of Labor survey found that 60% of all employed women work
in order to provide the sole support for themselves and their dependents or to supplement
the income of husbands earning less than $6,000 a year.
14. Since this was written, the Supreme Court has reversed the lower court de-cision, Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Board, 411 U.S. 947 (1974). By basing its opinion on a theory
of deprivation of procedural due process, however, the Court has made the impact of its
new ruling difficult to estimate. It is clear, however, that it neither declared sex to be a
suspect classification, nor struck the BFOQ exception from the Title VII legislation.
15. In March 1972, of 53,296 thousands families, 6,191 thousands were headed by females.
4,489 thousands of these families were headed by white females (9.4% of all white families)
and 1,702 thousands were families headed by black and other females (30.1% of all black
and other families). Of the 6,191 thousands, over 33% were in the below low income level.
In 1971, the median income of female headed families was $5,114, compared with $10,930
for male headed famliies. See the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1973, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce Publication, 39, 40, 42, 339.
16. The only nationwide study of alimony and child support was made by the Support Coin-
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mittee of the Family Law Section, American Bar Association in 1965, when Ms. Una Rita
Quenstedt, then chairperson of the Committee, and Mr. Carl E. Winkler, former chair-
person of the Committee, made a survey of 575 demestic relations court judges, friends of
the court, and commissioners of domestic relations. This study indicates that alimony is
awarded in a very small percentage of cases.
17. See Nagel and Weitzman, "Women as Litigants," 23 Hastings Law Journal 171 (1971) and
the Quenstedt-Winkler Study mentioned above. In the Nagel-Weitzman article, a study re-
vealed that within one year after the divorce decree, only 38% of the fathers were in full
compliance with the support order; 20% had only partially complied, and in some cases
partial compliance only constituted a single payment. Forty-two percent of the fathers
made no payments at all. By the tenth year, the number of open cases had dropped from
163 to 149 as a result of the death of the father, the termination of his parental rights, or
the maturity of the children. By that year, only 12% of the fathers were fully complying
and 79% were in total non-compliance.
18. As of February 17, 1974, the following unions and professional associations have endorsed
the ERA: Airline Pilots Association; AFL-CIO; Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, International Union; Barbers, Hairdressers, and Cosmetol-
ogists International Union of America; Brewery, Floor, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery
Workers, International Union of; Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers International Union;
Chemical Workers Union, International; Communication Workers of America; Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, International Union of; Electrical Workers, International
Brotherhood of; Granite Cutters International Association of America; International Union
Department, AFL-CIO; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; International Brotherhood
of Painters and Allied Traders; Leather Workers International Union of America; The News-
paper Guild; National Professional Employees International Union; and United Auto
Workers.
19. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
20. Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Regarding the Griggs-type criteria, the
court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires the elimination of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of race, and if, as here, an employment practice that operated to
exclude Negroes, cannot be shown to be related to job performance, it is prohibited, not-
withstanding the employer's lack of discriminatory intent. The Act does not preclude the
use of testing, or measuring procedures, but it does proscribe giving them controlling force
unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
22. Fiss, "A Theory of Fair Employment Laws," 38 University of Chicago Law Review 235
(1971).
23. Southern Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (1971).
24. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
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